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Abstract
Decades of research suggest that social interaction influences opinion forma-
tion and affects voting behavior. However, recent work concerning the nexus
between deliberation and democratic practice—particularly in the American
context—has re-focused attention on the normative consequences of socially-
driven political behavior. Among the most common criticisms of interper-
sonal networks are that most people have very insular social circles, and that
when they do not they are unlikely to engage in politics. In this paper we
provide evidence that such pessimistic assessments are unwarranted, though
for somewhat unexpected reasons. Using data from the American Compo-
nent of the 1992 Cross-National Election Project and the 2000 American
National Election Study, we examine whether and under what conditions
social networks facilitate interest-based voting. Our findings indicate that
when networks provide unambiguous signals regarding candidates, that they
serve as potentially useful information shortcuts, facilitating connections be-
tween individuals’ vote decisions and their underlying preferences. And, be-
cause many Americans reside in reasonably supportive social environments,
networks often help citizens make “correct” voting decisions (Lau and Red-
lawsk 1997). In the end, social networks appear to help shoulder the demands
of democratic theory, but not by helping people learn about politics in any
traditional sense.
1 Introduction
A persistent theme in the study of American politics is that political behav-
ior is deeply rooted in social interaction. Of particular interest is whether
or not an individual’s political decisions depend on the character of their
interpersonal networks (Berelson, Lazarsfeld & McPhee 1954, Huckfeldt &
Sprague 1995, Levine 2005). Although some argue that the observed re-
lationships between networks and political behavior stem from how peo-
ple select their discussion partners (MacKuen 1990, Finifter 1974), evidence
from experiments and natural experiments (Nickerson 2008, Klofstad 2007b),
panel studies (Klofstad 2007a, Sokhey 2007), and careful statistical analy-
ses (Kenny 1992, Kenny 1994, Levine 2005) build a strong case that this is
a causal phenomenon. The theoretical explanation for such effects focuses
on the content of interaction, with the assumption being that political talk
produces deliberative exchanges that lead to learning and persuasion.
With the debate over whether and how social networks influence political
behavior now decades old, scholars have become increasingly interested in
understanding the normative implications that our social relationships have
for American democracy. To some degree this reflects age-old arguments
between social determinism and free will, especially in America where the
value of individualism is a highly prized cultural value. However, it also
stems from the struggle to make sense of mounting empirical evidence about
the political nature of Americans’ social circles. Among the most contested
points are whether or not people’s networks are too insular to create real
opportunities for learning about politics (Huckfeldt, Plutzer & Sprague 1993,
Mutz 2006), and whether the experience of disagreement holds too many
negative consequences to be valued for the learning that it may in fact spawn
(Mutz 2002a, Mutz 2002b, McClurg 2006a, McClurg 2006b).
We contribute to this conversation about the normative consequences of
social influence by examining how interpersonal networks affect the quality of
voting decisions. Using Lau and Redlawsk’s (1997; 2008) measure of correct
voting as a baseline for this normative assessment, we specifically evaluate
the contribution of two elements of social networks—socially-supplied dis-
agreeement and socially-supplied expertise—to whether or not people cast
“good” votes in presidential elections. Drawing on analysis of survey data
from the American component of the 1992 Cross-National Election Project
and the 2000 American National Election Study, we find that for many Amer-
icans—under two widely-divergent electoral settings—social networks create
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conditions that promote voting in a manner that is consistent with one’s pref-
erences, the underlying standard of Lau and Redlawsk’s measure. Interest-
ingly, we find little indication that the process by which networks help people
to “do the right thing” involves learning (in a conventional sense), and more
evidence suggesting that this phenomenon has to do with the availability of a
useful informational shortcut (Downs 1957). As this finding has substantial
implications for multiple lines of research, our discussion situates the results
in-between the established literature on social influence, more recent work
examining the effectiveness of everyday deliberative discussion (Jackman &
Sniderman 2006), and considerations of aggregate rationality (e.g., Page and
Shapiro 1992). In the end, we argue that the findings paint a positive picture
for democratic practice, as most of the American civic landscape is charac-
terized by networks that have a little bit of political dissonance, but that are
largely supportive.
2 The Demands of Citizenship
2.1 Evaluating Democratic Competence
Volumes of empirical research support a conception of individuals as cog-
nitive misers who fail to live up to the demanding normative standards of
democratic theory. It is widely accepted that citizens are limited in their
ability to process information and are often constrained in the amount of
time that they can give to politics (Fiske & Taylor 1991). The consequences
of this have been ably listed in a large body of behavioral research noting the
public’s lack of ideological constraint in attitude formation (Converse 1964),
its relatively low levels of political knowledge (Carpini & Keeter 1996), its
diminished ability to recall vote choices (Wright 1990, Wright 1992), and its
lack of interest in politics.
Yet voters do make frequent decisions regarding politics, and more recent
studies of voting behavior have attempted to determine whether the actual
strategies employed by voters work “well enough” for democratic politics to
function effectively in America. In an early example of such work, V.O. Key,
Jr.’s (1966) investigation of retrospective voting in the United States lowers
the normative bar for citizens from one where they are actively engaged
in politics to one where they are merely required to hold elected officials
accountable for past actions. In his wake, a generation of research indicated
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that individuals frequently employ a variety of similar shortcuts when making
political decisions (Lupia 1994, Popkin 1994, Simon 1985, Lau & Redlawsk
2001). Whether such shortcuts are sufficient for ensuring quality decision-
making, especially across different informational contexts, is still a matter
of debate (Kuklinski & Quirk 2000, Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit & Rich 2001,
Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit, Schweider & Rich 2000, Jerit, Barabas & Bolsen
2006). What is important in the context of this paper is that the normative
debate has shifted to examining the eventual quality of decisions rather than
the processes—ideal or otherwise—through which such choices are derived.
It is from this perspective that we will evaluate the normative impact of
social networks.
2.2 Correct Voting as a Measure of Decision Quality
To proceed in this manner, it is necessary to have a clear definition of what
constitutes a “good” or “quality” decision. There are a number of ways to
approach this issue, such as examining the informational content behind opin-
ions, the movement of aggregate opinion, or the difference between electoral
outcomes and simulated “fully informed” voter outcomes. For the purposes
of this paper, we base our study on Lau and Redlawsk’s concept of correct
voting. In introducing their notion of “correct voting”—one based not on
ideology or universal values, but on what an individual would have chosen
under conditions of full information—they aimed to “set more realistic goals
for democratic citizens” (1997: 593), arguing that visions of an apathetic and
incapable American citizenry were at least partially based on the civic bar
being set too high.
Lau and Redlaswk’s conceptualization of correct voting is best understood
by considering their method for developing it. Experimental subjects were
exposed to a dynamic information environment that mimicked many of the
features of a real campaign. After casting hypothetical ballots, individuals
were then allowed full access to all information and were asked to reconsider
their choice. Any subject who changed his or her mind was marked as having
cast an “incorrect vote,” while all others were marked as “correct.” Since
Lau and Redlawsk’s ultimate purpose was to examine voting in real elec-
toral contexts, they used this experimental setting to validate a “normative
naive” measure derived from the American National Election Studies—this
measure is essentially a prediction of which candidate a citizen should prefer
given her views on partisanship, political issues, group endorsements, and
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candidate personality. Lau and Redlawsk found a strong degree of corre-
spondence (a 66% overlap) between this item and the experimental subjects’
own assessments of how “good” their votes were in the hypothetical election.
Recognizing that this is but one way to define a quality decision, we
use the Lau and Redlawsk standard for two reasons. First, unlike other well-
regarded studies of how the electorate’s lack of sophistication affects political
behavior (Bartels 1996, Althaus 1998, Gilens 2001), this measure can be
readily applied to the study of individuals. Although the question of how
networks affect aggregate decision-making is also of interest (e.g., Ahn et al.
2007), both empirical and normative studies of network effects have focused
principally on individuals, and we seek to add to that debate. Second, the
correct voting measure was designed to be constructed and replicated using
the American National Election Study series (or comparable data sets). Since
several recent surveys—namely, the 2000 ANES and the independent, but
similar 1992 CNEP—include variables that measure social networks, this
makes it amenable to the type of study that we propose. Moreover, earlier
research on social influence, voter sophistication and correct voting have deep
roots in these data sets, thus giving us a nice pool of research against which
to judge network effects.
3 The Democratic Value of Social Networks
Networks are often touted for their ability to reduce electoral information
costs (Downs 1957), and consistent with this view, existing scholarship demon-
strates that social information affects political calculations (Beck, Dalton,
Greene & Huckfeldt 2002), attitudes and opinion formation (Huckfeldt &
Sprague 1995), and the ability to process political information (Huckfeldt
2001, Huckfeldt 2007, McClurg 2006a). At the same time, it is well recognized
that interpersonal networks regulate voters’ exposure to broader information
environments (Granovetter 1973, Huckfeldt, Beck, Dalton & Levine 1995),
thereby insulating people from certain types of political stimuli and bias-
ing their decisions. It is this contrast between the informational and insu-
lating functions of networks that gives them complexity and leads to the
widely-circulated conclusion that they have mixed normative consequences
(Mutz 2006).
But how does this same set of defined network roles factor in when we
consider the quality of vote decisions? Should we expect voters who are
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exposed to multiple points of view to be in a better position to vote in a
manner that is consistent with their underlying interests? Or, are more in-
sular social networks actually better environments for nurturing well-defined
connections between electoral choices and self-stated preferences? When it
comes to socially-supplied expertise, do we find that people with access to
sophisticated discussion partners do a better job of voting correctly? Or,
are those with access to experts so susceptible to manipulation from their
surrounding social environment that they make mistakes at the ballot box?
3.1 The Political Content of Networks & Correct Vot-
ing
The political content of discussion—that is, whether it is supportive or dis-
agreeable—is by far the most debated element of social networks. The
dilemma is most clearly outlined by Diana Mutz, who demonstrates that
talking politics with people who have different points of view (an everyday ap-
proximation of deliberation) has both negative and positive consequences for
American democracy. On the one hand, such conversations increase knowl-
edge about opposing points of view, resulting in higher levels of political
tolerance. On the other, they produce attitudinal ambivalence and lower the
likelihood of political participation (Mutz 2002a, Mutz 2002b).
Informal political disagreement should also have negative consequences
for correct voting. Although it is possible that the tolerance and learning
that disagreement promotes would lead those involved in such discussions to
gain a better grasp on their political choices, there are a number of reasons
to expect the end result to be an “incorrect” decision. First, Mutz’s own
evidence points to ambivalence and not stronger attitudes as an end result of
disagreement. While ambivalence may not be bad in and of itself, it should
make it more difficult for a person to translate their predilections into a
“correct” decision.
Second, agreeable networks can be effective information shortcuts because
of their relatively high levels of political and demographic isomorphism (Mutz
2006, Marsden 1987). The basic idea here is consistent with Downs’ original
formulation how social connections influence votes—our family and friends
likely have similar interests and views to us because of shared backgrounds.
Thus, if someone wants to know how people like themselves “should” vote,
then conducting an informal poll of their associates may be an effective,
5
efficient way of figuring that out. However, this kind of approach will only
be successful if a network provides a clear signal and an individual follows
its lead.
On this basis we posit the following political disagreement hypothesis : the
more people are exposed to political disagreement in their social networks,
the less likely they are to cast a correct vote. We also try to examine and
discern between, as best as we can with available data, the two different
mechanisms which might produce this result: 1) attitudinal ambivalence
surrounding the vote decision and 2) the network functioning as a simple
informational shortcut—and in the case of disagreement, one that fails to
provide a clear, unambiguous signal about candidate preference.
3.2 Social Expertise and Correct Voting
To the extent that discussant political sophistication is the subject of inquiry,
it has been uniformly treated as a “good” normative trait for social networks
to possess. McClurg (2006a) argues that people who have access to political
experts in their social networks are more likely to participate, in part because
they are able to draw on the knowledge of their friends and family to develop a
clearer understanding of the context surrounding political choices. Consistent
with this we offer the political expertise hypothesis : as the level of political
sophistication in a voter’s social network increases, she is more likely to cast
a correct vote.
The logic here is straightforward. Voting correctly requires a citizen to
identify differences between candidates with respect to issue positions, per-
sonalities, and group endorsements. It also requires citizens to take this
knowledge about the candidates and to determine how it relates to their
own positions. In both respects, having access to a social supply of political
expertise is useful. Respondents who have more knowledgeable people in
their network are more likely to have conversations in which differences are
clarified and lingering questions answered.
4 Data
We investigate our hypotheses with data from the American component of
the 1992 Cross-National Election Project and the 2000 American National
Election Study, as these are the best available data for exploring the rela-
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tionship between social networks and correct voting. As noted, the correct
voting measure was developed so that it could be compiled from any typical
ANES-like survey (Lau & Redlawsk 1997), and thus not only does this mean
that the measure has been validated for (at least one of) our data sources,
but that the multiple questions needed to compute it are generally available.
Additionally, these are the only two nationally-representative studies that
incorporate both social network questions and myriad political items.1
In the 2000 ANES study, respondents were asked to identify up to 4 dis-
cussion partners; they were then asked whether or not each named discussant
voted for the same candidate they did, as well as how knowledgeable they
felt each of their discussants was about politics. While the 2000 study pro-
vides a complete measure of correct voting and a full set of individual-level
control variables, it yields a smaller set of social network questions. By com-
parison, the 1992 CNEP study provides more-detailed network data, with
up to four “important matters” discussants and a separate question asking
for an additional fifth, “political” discussant. However, the 1992 CNEP has
fewer individual-level control variables (e.g., the “need for cognition” mea-
sure) and lacks a political knowledge battery—this makes our estimate of
correct voting in 1992 only an approximation of the procedure used by Lau
and Redlawsk (1997, 2008). In analyzing both data sets, we sum across
respondent-discussant pairings to create network averages for network dis-
agreement and network sophistication.
Importantly, however, using both data sets allows us to test the link be-
tween social networks and correct voting under the electoral condition of a
three-party contest. Analyzing U.S. presidential elections between 1972 and
2004, Lau, Andersen, and Redlawsk (2008) demonstrate that the difficulty of
casting a “correct” vote increases as a function of aggregate electoral factors,
particularly situations in which there are more than two legitimate candi-
dates. Responding to this aspect of their research design, we examine how
networks facilitate correct voting under the more demanding condition of the
1992 election.2
1In the past the General Social Survey has included network questions, but not nearly
as many detailed political items as the ANES or the 1992 CNEP.
2In looking at aggregate rates of correct voting between 1972 and 2004, Lau et al.
(2008) report that 1992 had the second lowest percentage of correct voting, and 2000 the
second highest. Thus, although we only have two electoral “cases” to compare, we have
good variation when it comes to the aggregate distribution of our dependent variable.
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4.1 Measuring Correct Voting
The procedure for operationalizing a correct vote is fairly complicated, and
involves the creation of a running count of which candidate is preferred by
respondents on a variety of political factors: partisanship, views on salient
groups, views on candidate personality, and issue positions. The most diffi-
cult aspect of creating the measure comes in determining the voter’s candi-
date preferences with respect to issues; this is because the directional voting
calculation requires an objective estimate of the candidates’ positions on the
issues.3 Lau and Redlawsk measure the candidates’ position by finding the
average placement of the candidates by all voters who are above the median
in political knowledge.4 The normative naive expectation of this measure is
that a voter should prefer the candidate whom they rate above all others,
across all the aforementioned factors; a “correct vote” is one that is consis-
tent with this expectation. We follow this procedure as closely as possible in
2000, but must make a handful of adjustments in 1992 due to differences in
the items available.5
3Lau and Redlawsk (1997) and Lau, Anderson, and Redlawsk (2008) use Rabinowitz
and MacDonald’s (1989) approach for estimating issue distance—a procedure we replicate
as closely as possible.
4The ANES has released information indicating that some of the open-ended knowledge
items included in recent years’ studies have been mishandled, thereby providing incorrect
estimates of the public’s stock of political knowledge. However, we are confident that
these errors would not change the results of Lau and Redlawsk’s previous works (and
that they do not affect our results in this paper). First, the preliminary investigation has
revealed that only a few questions are involved—across various years—and that the result
is an under- rather than over- estimate of what the public knows. Second, to create their
political knowledge index for any particular year, Lau, Anderson and Redlawsk use every
item in the relevant ANES study that has an objective, correct answer; for example, in
the 2000 ANES, they use over 20 items to create the additive index, and we replicate
this. While an incorrect count on one component of the index may result in a tiny bit of
measurement error on the dependent variable in the 2000 data (the 1992 CNEP study is
independent of the ANES series, and therefore unaffected), adjusting up the number of
correct answers to one item should not alter the results in any meaningful way.
5Notably, as we have no political knowledge items in the 1992 study, we construct the
measure using those who score above the median in formal education. Please see Appendix
A for a full discussion.
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5 Networks and Correct Voting in 2000
We begin our analysis by examining data from the 2000 election. Roughly
85% of all respondents cast a correct vote, with 81% of Gore voters making
a correct choice and 90% of Bush voters making the right decision.6 We
first estimate a baseline model of correct voting that only includes salient
individual-level predictors identified in previous research (Lau, Andersen &
Redlawsk 2008). We then add the network variables that are of central
interest, evaluating both their direct impact on correct voting, as well as
how their addition changes the model results.
Individual-level variables fall into three categories—motivation, expertise,
and heuristics (Lau, Andersen & Redlawsk 2008). For motivation, we include
the respondent’s answer to a question about how closely s/he followed the
election. We also include a measure of policy distinctiveness which examines
the extent to which the voter perceives issue differences between the two
candidates. This is computed by first finding the directional voting score
for the respondent on each issue for both candidates, averaging those scores
by candidate, and then taking the absolute difference in the two candidate’s
scores. Expertise is measured with the typical ANES categorical measure of
education, a knowledge index based on answers to eight factual questions,
and a measure of how much respondents like complex problems (the “need
for cognition” battery). Finally, informational heuristics are measured by
including how strongly a respondent identifies with a political party.7
As shown in Table 1, the first model is consistent with previous research
by Lau and Redlawsk. Voters who pay more attention to the election, who are
stronger partisans, who have higher levels of education, and who see clearer
differences between the candidates are more likely to cast votes consistent
with their underlying preferences. Surprisingly, we find that political knowl-
edge has no effect on correct voting. Additionally, we discover that voters
who score high on the “need for cognition” measure are actually less likely
to cast a correct vote (the coefficient is marginally significant; p = .054).
6Lau, Anderson, and Redlawsk (2008) report a slightly lower rate (just over 80%) of
correct voting in 2000, though their estimates are based on the mean of four slightly
different measures of correct voting.
7Although Lau et al. (2008) include a number of additional demographic variables in
their model—variables that emerge as statistically significant—none of them reach stan-
dard levels of statistical significance in our models. We believe this is at least partly due
to the differences in sample sizes between their study (n = 5865) and ours (n = 1072).
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Table 1: Individual and Social Predictors of Correct Voting in 2000, Logit
Model
Variables Model #1 Model #2
β∗ Std. Err. β∗ Std. Err.
Network Measures
Network Disagreement -0.98 0.30***
Network Sophistication 0.33 0.17#
Motivation
Followed Election 0.30 0.13* 0.26 0.13*
Policy Distinctiveness 0.33 0.12** 0.34 0.12**
Expertise
Education 0.24 0.07*** 0.22 0.07**
Knowledge -0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.05
Need for Cognition -0.69 0.36# -0.70 0.36#
Heuristics
Party Strength 0.69 0.10*** 0.69 0.10***
Constant -0.87 0.39* -0.69 0.39
N 1080 1072
Wald χ2 96.99*** 97.76***
# <p.10,*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 all two-tailed tests.
Inclusion of the network variables has no effect on these variables. In
fact, most of them have similar estimates for their coefficients and standard
deviations, attesting to the fact that social networks have consequences above
and beyond the individual-level determinants of “correct” voting previously
identified in the literature.
Consistent with our hypotheses, people who cast presidential ballots that
are different from those that are cast by their family, friends, and associates
are less likely to make a correct decision. Whether this reflects ambivalence
about the candidates or shows what happens when people ignore a readily
available information shortcut is not clear at this point (we will turn to this
shortly). The evidence that network sophistication bolsters correct voting is
weaker. The relationship is in the expected direction, but the p-value (p =
.054) is only slightly above typically accepted levels of statistical significance
and is very sensitive to model specification—accordingly, we are hesitant to
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put too much stock in this finding.8
Figure 1: Effect of Significant Variables Across Full Range of Values, 2000
In Figure 1 we estimate the effect of our significant variables by showing
how much the probability of a correct vote changes for their full range of
values. Although we observe that the social network variables have less of
an effect on correct voting than partisan strength, they still have important
consequences. Network disagreement has an effect that is greater than ten
percentage points and is similar in impact to both education and policy
distinctiveness. And, while network sophistication has the smallest effect at
around 6%, it compares favorably to the effect of interest in the election.
8In alternative specifications, we examined network size and the frequency of political
discussion, finding neither to be significant predictors of correct voting (or factors that
altered the results presented). Additionally, we considered the possibility of an interactive,
conditional relationship between network expertise and network disagreement, but found
no evidence to support this—the interaction was insignificant across the full range of the
variables (Brambor, Clark & Golder 2006).
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6 Networks and Correct Voting in 1992
We now move to examine the relationship between networks and correct
voting under the more demanding conditions of the 1992 presidential election.
Of course, the 1992 contest introduced America to a previously unknown
governor from Arkansas, and most importantly, presented citizens with an
extra, non-partisan choice: a Texas billionaire whose money bought him
ballot access and news coverage (Rosenstone et al. 1996), but who managed
to cloud his candidacy and potentially confuse the electorate by jumping in
and out of the race.
Under exceptional circumstances such as these, we might expect a greater
portion of the American electorate to get it wrong, and indeed, we find this
to be the case: our estimate of correct voting indicates that only 59% of all
respondents cast a correct vote.9 Fortunately, our CNEP estimate jells with
that of Lau, Anderson, and Redlawsk’s (2008), who find that only 60% of
the public voted correctly in 1992 (they use the 1992 ANES).
Our operationalization for heuristics (in the form of strength of partisan-
ship) is identical to that used in 2000, and we include the same two factors
under the category of motivation, though the policy distinctiveness measure
is calculated using a different (and smaller) set of items (please see Appendix
A for details). Unfortunately, because we lack several of the measures that
are common to the ANES, we are forced to present a much more limited test
of the category of expertise—specifically, we have no knowledge battery or
items tapping respondents’ “need for cognition.”10
Table 2 presents our results, and the findings in Model 1 comport with
those of both Lau et al. (2008) and the results of the 2000 analysis. Those
who pay more attention to the election and who are stronger partisans are
more likely to cast votes consistent with their underlying preferences. Cu-
riously, neither education nor the policy distinctiveness measure emerge as
significant predictors, though we speculate that in the case of the latter it
is because the measure is constructed from a fairly limited number of items.
In Model 2 we introduce our network measures, and as before their inclusion
does not affect the relative impact of the other variables. That is, even under
9Looking at correct voting by candidate choice, we estimate that Democrats made the
right decision in the highest percentage (85%), followed by Republicans (44%) and Perot
voters (22%).
10To be clear, the 1992 CNEP was different from the 1992 ANES—the 1992 ANES has
knowledge questions, but no social network battery.
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Table 2: Individual and Social Predictors of Correct Voting in 1992, Logit
Model
Variables Model #1 Model #2
β∗ Std. Err. β∗ Std. Err.
Network Measures
Network Candidate Disagreement -1.00 0.29***
Network Freq.of Disagreement 0.13 0.13
Network Sophistication 0.14 0.17
Motivation
Followed Election 0.25 0.12* 0.23 0.12#
Policy Distinctiveness -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03
Expertise
Education 0.00 0.03 -0.00 0.03
Heuristics
Party Strength 0.49 0.07*** 0.48 0.08***
Constant -1.46 0.47** -1.30 0.48**
N 857 857
Wald χ2 53.75*** 65.56***
# <p.10,*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 all two-tailed tests.
the more demanding aggregate electoral condition of a three party contest,
again we find added value by looking to social influence.11
Figure 2 plots the change in the probability of correct voting for statis-
tically significant variables. Like Lau et al. (2008), we observe the largest
single effect for partisan strength; it produces a change in the probability
of correct voting of over 30%. Importantly, however, in the 1992 data po-
litical disagreement emerges as an even larger effect than it did in 2000 (it
11As in the previous analysis, we tested alternative specifications, finding frequency of
discussion to have no bearing upon correct voting, and no support for a potential condi-
tional relationship between network expertise and network disagreement (the interaction is
insignificant across the full range of values (Brambor et al. 2006)). Interestingly, network
size does exhibit a significant, positive relationship in 1992, with respondents in larger
networks being more likely to cast a correct vote. However, the findings for network can-
didate disagreement, following the election, and strength of partisanship remain robust to
its inclusion. We suspect that network size’s significance in 1992 relative to its insignifi-
cance in 2000 is largely due to the extra variance introduced through the CNEP’s request
for an additional, fifth, discussant.
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produces a change of nearly 25%)—thus, this network measure stacks up
favorably against the significant individual-level variables, beginning to rival
partisan strength while quickly outpacing the motivational factor of inter-
est in the election (the effect for this item is about 10%). When viewed
against the 2000 results, these findings suggest that the signals regarding
candidate support sent by unambiguous, supportive networks may be even
more important in complex information environments.
Figure 2: Effect of Significant Variables Across Full Range of Values, 1992
7 Unpacking the Impact of Network Disagree-
ment
Thus far the results strongly support the notion that network sophistication
is relatively unimportant for correct voting, while disagreement has an influ-
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ence that is only consistently surpassed by the strength of a person’s party
identification. As we suggested previously, there may be two separate rea-
sons why network disagreement might be related to correct voting. The first
possibility is that voters who are exposed to multiple points of view learn
about different arguments for and against candidates, potentially creating
ambivalence and making their final decision more difficult. Under such cir-
cumstances, we suggest, they are less likely to make a “correct” decision as it
is defined by the Lau and Redlawsk measure. The second possibility is that
networks can serve as a useful information shortcut for voters, particularly
when they are unambiguous, pointing clearly in one direction. When all of
one’s networked family, friends, and associates are planning to vote the same
way—our argument goes—then a strong signal is sent that voting that way
is consistent with one’s underlying interests. This is based on the fact that
social networks have a great amount of social and political similarity built
into them.
To start sorting out these different mechanisms, we directly measure the
impact of the first—ambivalence about the candidates—while still controlling
for network disagreement; we use these results to assess the possibilities.
This creates four scenarios for interpreting our findings: If both measures
are statistically insignificant, it implies that there is some other mechanism
at work that we have not yet identified. If both are significant, then it
implies that both mechanisms are at work, and the relative strength of the
coefficients may shed some light on how important each is to correct voting.
If only the ambivalence measure is significant it lends weight to the learning-
only explanation, while if only the disagreement measure is significant it
would indicate the opposite, meaning that it is the informational shortcut
mechanism.
Our measures of ambivalence differ somewhat between the 1992 and 2000
data. In 2000 we can directly measure ambivalence towards the candidates
based on the likes and dislikes of both Gore and Bush (Lavine 2001). This
measure ranges from a possible low of -7.5, indicating a strong and polarized
reaction to the candidates, to a high of 5.0, where reactions to both candi-
dates are weak and ambivalent. Unfortunately, these open ended questions
were not asked in the CNEP, preventing us from taking a similar approach
with those data. However, Lavine (2001) demonstrates that one of the prin-
cipal results of candidate ambivalence is to delay making a voting decision,
indicating that we can use a timing question as an indirect measure. This
item is available in both data sets, and is coded such that higher values
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represent later decision dates and, consequently, more ambivalence.
Table 3: Political Disagreement, Ambivalence, and Correct Voting, Logit
Models
Variables 2000 ANES 1992 CNEP
β∗ Std. Err. β∗ Std. Err. β∗ Std. Err.
Ambivalence Measure
Candidate Ambivalence -0.06 0.05
Timing of Vote Decision -0.21 0.06*** -0.09 0.07
Network Measures
Network Cand. Disagreement -0.97 0.26*** -0.86 0.31** -0.94 0.30**
Sophistication 0.36 0.18* 0.28 0.19 0.14 0.17
Frequency of Disagreement 0.12 0.13
Motivation
Followed Election 0.27 0.13* 0.22 0.13# 0.25 0.12*
Policy Distinctiveness 0.33 0.12** 0.29 0.13* -0.02 0.03
Expertise
Education 0.23 0.07*** 0.23 0.08** -0.01 0.03
Knowledge -0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.05
Need for Cognition -0.69 0.36# -0.74 0.37*
Heuristics
Party Strength 0.70 0.11*** 0.59 0.11*** 0.45 0.08***
Constant -0.77 0.40# 0.09 0.45 -1.05 0.51***
N 1061 1066 849
LR χ2 99.74*** 117.13*** 65.60***
# <p.10,*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 all two-tailed tests.
The evidence in Table 3 is somewhat mixed, but points in the direction of
ambivalence not being the principal mechanism. First, in two of three cases
our measure of ambivalence is statistically insignificant, including when we
can directly measure the respondent’s underlying attitudes towards the can-
didates. Second, in all three cases the direct measure of political disagree-
ment remains statistically significant and in the expected direction. Third,
in analyses not shown here, the statistical significance of the 2000 candidate
ambivalence measure and the 1992 timing of vote measure depend not on
the exclusion of network disagreement, but on the exclusion of strength of
partisanship. In other words, our findings indicate that it is the relationship
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between partisanship and ambivalence that matters most.
To be fair, we do find limited evidence in support of the ambivalence
mechanism. Not only is the timing of vote decision significant in the 2000
ANES, but the size of the political disagreement coefficient is reduced by ap-
proximately 14%. Nevertheless, this is weak evidence. This particular result
holds even when we simultaneously include the candidate ambivalence vari-
able in the model, suggesting that is the portion of variance in the timing of
vote variable that is unrelated to ambivalence that is affecting correct voting
in 2000. Moreover, we cannot rule out the possibility that the second mech-
anism—the clarity of the social network as an information shortcut—drives
the timing of vote decision as well. Most importantly, the network disagree-
ment measure remains statistically robust and a strong predictor of correct
voting even when this (indirect) measure of ambivalence is significant.
In sum, across two nationally-representative data sets and using multiple
measures of candidate ambivalence, we find that political disagreement re-
mains a robust predictor of correct voting. And to the best of our knowledge,
for this particular outcome this reflects people leaning on their networks as
simple informational shortcuts rather than as sources of learning and per-
suasion. Moreover, this finding comes despite robust evidence—even in our
own data—that network sophsitication and disagreement both influence can-
didate ambivalence and the timing of the vote decision. Although we would
be remiss if we did not point out that a stronger test of this mechanism is
necessary, the evidence clearly points in this direction.
8 Discussion and Conclusion
The sociologists of the Columbia school recognized the tendency of individu-
als to affiliate with people like themselves (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954), and
argued that social circles trend toward political homogeneity over the course
of electoral campaigns (Berelson et al. 1954). Since that time, scholars have
concerned themselves with interpersonal political disagreement, investigating
the factors that permit its survival (Huckfeldt et al. 2004) while noting its
attitudinal and behavioral consequences (e.g., Mutz 2002a; 2002b). Bringing
together various strands of research on social influence, this paper advances
the literature by focusing on the relationship between networks and the qual-
ity of the most common form of political participation, voting.
Looking at the American context, some have questioned whether net-
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works are too insular to help people learn about politics. However, given
the results of these analyses, we see the question as not being about whether
networks inhibit learning, but about determining what kind of learning they
facilitate, and under what conditions. An important part of our story is
the finding that the relationship between network disagreement and correct
voting appears to be driven by the presence of an informational shortcut.
Although future work—particularly in the experimental laboratory—should
pursue this further, we take this as strong evidence that when it comes to
their capacity to help votes match self-stated preferences, networks do not
operate by providing in-depth learning opportunities. Networks have in a
certain sense always been touted as informational shortcuts (Downs 1957;
Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), and the classic formulation relied on the dis-
cussion and persuasion taking place therein. However, our work suggests
that while social circles potentially cut cognitive costs, that individuals may
be able to glean important information from their discussion networks about
how they should vote without actually engaging in meaningful political dis-
cussion. In other words, when it comes to matching votes to self-interest,
“cross-cutting talk,” or what people do in networks, may be of less conse-
quence than whether the network sends clear, unambiguous signals about
candidate preference.
That being said, we wish to be clear about what we are and are not
arguing relative to others studying political talk, deliberation, and demo-
cratic practice. For example, Jackman and Sniderman (2006) suggest that
“deliberation is for naught” because they find that it often leads individu-
als to ideologically inconsistent positions (272). We emphasize that we are
not suggesting that the deliberation obtained through everyday interpersonal
political disagreement is bad per se, or that more traditional learning and
persuasion can not or does not occur through networks. Rather, our findings
indicate that when it comes to structuring “correct” voting behavior, discus-
sion 1) may not be necessary and 2) does not appear to be doing the heavy
lifting. Whether this social-mechanism applies to other outcomes of interest
is an empirical question, though we suspect that it is likely limited to the
ever-important, but limited, condition of vote choice.
Of course, we have also found a consistent relationship between networks
and correct voting across multiple presidential elections. In one simple sense,
this gives us confidence in the robustness of our results. More importantly,
however, it helps us to begin to tease out the broader contextual determinants
of network effects, in this case suggesting that networks facilitate “correct”
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decision-making even when the electoral system places greater cognitive de-
mands on individuals. In 1992 voters were faced with a legitimate third party
candidate; Perot was well-financed, and took positions close to the other two
candidates on a variety of issues. The fact that network disagreement pro-
duces a much larger effect in 1992 than in 2000 suggests that interpersonal
networks may be especially important resources in times when voters’ usual
way of organizing the political world—their partisanship—either fails them
or is rendered less effective. Future work should explore the link between net-
works and correct voting in lower-ticket races and non-presidential election
years.
Finally, one of the more surprising findings from previous research on de-
mocratic competence is the seeming rationality of electorates, in contrast to
the lack of constraint and knowledge that is often observed at the individual-
level (Page and Shapiro 1992) Typical explanations for this tend to empha-
size the so-called “miracle of aggregation,” where individual errors cancel out
in the aggregate. Our findings concerning the social fabric of American voters
suggest that networks are more than just efficient channels for information
distribution (Huckfeldt et al. 2004), but that they actually promote more
individual rationality—here in the form of correct voting—than we would
see if people were truly isolated decision-makers. While much remains to be
done in the testing and unpacking of this dynamic, our results suggest that
previous conceptions of “the rational public” have been misspecified, over-
looking the important role that networks play as links between individual




Voting Correctly The correct voting measure has three components: party
identification (re-scaled to run between -1 and 1), candidate placement on a
series of 7 issues, and candidate-group linkages. The measure is created by
taking every item in the survey that has an objectively correct answer (we
use 20 items), and forming an additive index. Respondents who rank above
the median on this index of political knowledge are then used to determine
the placement of each of the candidates on each of the issues, and which
candidates are associated with which groups. Rabinowitz and MacDon-
ald’s (1989) directional calculation (candidate location-neutral point)*(voter
location-neutral point)) is used to determine how much each voter agrees
with each candidate on each of the seven issues.
For candidate-group linkages, the ANES asked respondents whether they
felt close to 13 different groups (1=close; 0=not close). Crosstabulations
were calculated from among the politically knowledgeable to determine which
groups were associated with each of the candidates (if there was no statisti-
cally significant relationship, neither candidate was assigned to the group).
The final equation for each respondent, for each of the candidates, in-
volves summing the following and dividing by the total number of items:
the individual’s score on the rescaled party identification measure, her scores
for whether or not she reported feeling close to each of the groups assigned
to the candidates (again, the assignment of groups to equations depends on
the crosstabulations), and her seven directional issue scores for each of the
candidates.
A respondent is considered to have voted “correctly” if she votes for the
candidate who receives the highest score.
Note: The remaining variables are presented in the order in which they are
listed in Table 1
Network Political Disagreement: 0-1, averaged across the network; a
respondent and discussant are coded as being in disagreement if they voted
for different candidates.
Network Political Sophistication: 0-2, averaged across the network; a
respondent ranks each discussant as either knowing little (0), some (1), or a
great deal (2) about politics.
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Followed Election: 0-3, where 0 is “hardly” following the election, and 3
is “most of the time”
Policy Distinctiveness:A measure of how distinct the candidates were on
the major issues of the election. We use nine issue items, and modify Lau
and Redlawsk’s measure—instead of using the Rabinowitz and MacDonald
measure (1989), we multiply a respondent’s position on an issue * their rat-
ing of a candidate on that issue. We then sum across all issues, and take the
absolute difference of the scores for each candidate. Higher scores on this
measure = greater perceived policy distinctiveness between the candidates.
Education: formal education, in 7 categories.
Political Knowledge: 0-10, an additive index based on answers to 10 fac-
tual items
Need for Cognition: A measure running between 0 and .875, created by
adding an item asking about the extent to which a respondents like think-
ing, and a dichotomous item asking respondents whether they like complex
problems; this result is then divided by 2.
Partisan Strength: 1-4; 1=independent, 4=strong partisan
1992 CNEP
Voting Correctly The 1992 version of the correct voting measure contains
the same three components as in the 2000 calculation, though the 1992 data
did not include a political knowledge battery (and no more than a couple
of items that had “objectively” correct answers); it also contains fewer is-
sue questions (4 instead of 7), and fewer group items (11 rather than 13).
Critically, however, it does contain evaluative information on all three major
candidates.
Because there are no political knowledge items, respondents who rank
above the median on formal education are used to determine the placement
of each of the three candidates on each of the four issues, as well as on the
candidate-group linkages. Rabinowitz and MacDonald’s (1989) directional
calculation (candidate location-neutral point)*(voter location-neutral point))
is used to determine how much each voter agrees with each candidate on each
of the four issues.
For candidate-group linkages, the CNES asked respondents whether they
felt close to 11 different groups (1=close; 0=not close). Crosstabulations were
calculated (among those above the median in formal education) to determine
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which groups were associated with each of the three candidates (if there was
no statistically significant relationship, no candidate was assigned the group;
Perot was not associated with any group).
The final equations for each respondent, for each of the candidates, in-
volve summing over the score on the rescaled party identification measure
(we also include an “anti-party identification” measure for Perot that runs
from 0-2), the scores for whether or not the respondent reported feeling close
to each of the groups assigned to each of the candidates (again, this is di-
chotomous (1=close), and which groups go into which equation depends on
the crosstabulations), and the four directional issue scores for each of the
candidates. As before, this sum is divided by the total number of items.
A respondent is considered to have voted “correctly” if she voted for the
candidate who received the highest score (and in this case, the highest score
among the three candidates).
Note: The remaining variables are presented in the order in which they are
listed in Table 2
Network Candidate Disagreement: 0-1, averaged across the (up to) 5
members of the network; a respondent and discussant are coded as being in
disagreement if they voted for different candidates.
Network Frequency of Disagreement: 0-3, averaged across the network;
a respondent reports disagreeing with each discussant (0) never, rarely (1),
sometimes (2), often (3).
Network Political Sophistication: 0-2, averaged across the network; a
respondent ranks each discussant as either knowing little (0), some (1), or a
great deal (2) about politics.
Followed Election: (technically “interest in the campaign”): 0=not much;
1=some; 2=very much.
Policy Distinctiveness:A measure of how distinct the candidates were on
the major issues of the election. We use four issue items (these are the
only four items for which we have both respondents’ self-identified positions,
and their ratings of the three candidates), and modify Lau and Redlawsk’s
measure—instead of using the Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989) directional
calculation, we multiply a respondent’s position on an issue * their rating of
the candidate on that issue. We then sum across all issues, and take the
absolute difference of the scores for each candidate. Higher scores on this
measure = greater perceived policy distinctiveness between the candidates.
Education: formal education, 1-20 years.
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Partisan Strength:1-4; 1=independent, 4=strong partisan
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